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CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS, Vol. 2 (Choice of Law), J. G. CASTEL,
Toronto: Butterworths, 1977. Pp. 791.
Professor Castel has now completed his study on the Canadian conflict
of laws. Canadian lawyers will probably find this second volume the most
practical part of his work; its scope is exhaustive. Almost every legal topic
that can raise conflicts issues is covered in detail. The views of the author
fairly accurately reflect the views of the Canadian courts on most aspects of
conflicts. Professor Castel has demonstrated that there are a great many
Canadian conflicts cases, and his survey of them is impressive. The significance of all of those cases is more doubtful.
As might have been expected, the Canadian cases have nearly always
followed English precedent, and in almost every area of the law discussed
by Professor Castel, the leading cases are English. The authorities referred
to, however, are not only Canadian and English cases. The author has added
many references to American cases and to the Restatement of Conflicts. In
general, this is useful and offers some basis for comparing the approach of
both countries, though more could have been made of the comparison. References to various Hague Conventions on Conflicts are also useful; it is
helpful to have the text of the Conventions set out in full. Canada has begun
to participate in the Hague Conferences and, as a result, some of them may
be of practical importance to Canadian lawyers. Canadian legislatures have
not responded to any of these conventions with any enthusiasm and it remains
to be seen what use will be made of the results of the Hague Conferences.
Professor Castel also refers to the activities of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. The Commissioners have
made valiant efforts to avoid conflicts problems by ensuring the enactment of
uniform legislation on a variety of topics. It is useful to have reference to
their efforts, though, again, their significance is slight.
In short, this volume is a comprehensive reference book for those interested in Canadian conflicts, and Professor Castel is to be complimented for
his industry. To refer to this work as a reference book is in a sense unfair
to the author and some explanation has to be given of why the work is
regarded as having only this limited utility.
The basic difficulty faced by anyone who writes on conflicts is how to
achieve a reconciliation between fidelity to some theoretical structure for
choice of law and accuracy in representing what the courts have said and
done. If one adopts the theoretical approach of the leading English cases,
the results of the cases cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. If one rejects this
approach and offers some more or less radical alternative, the statements of
the judges in the cases cannot be accepted. I do not think that Professor
Castel ever dealt with this problem successfully. This failure, in my view,
is responsible for the major defect of the book. Simply put, the cases are not
critically analysed in a very useful manner.
A fair question to ask is what would be a useful way of analysing the
cases? In discussing the choice of law in contracts, Professor Castel states:
In the field of contracts, the best way to develop international trade and be
responsive to social commitments is to adopt conflict of laws rules that promote
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the doctrine of freedom of contract or party autonomy and protect the justifiable
expectations of the contracting parties. In this way certainty, predictability and
uniformity of results can be achieved. (at 514)

This is assumed as the basis for a justification of the traditional Anglo-Cana-

dian rules on choice of law in contracts-at least as that rule was formulated,
i.e., "the proper law of a contract is the jurisdiction with which the transaction
has its closest and most real connection." The difficulty is that the general
purpose for choice of law rules is, first, a distortion of what the purposes of
contract law are, and, secondly, regularly frustrated in the courts' application
of choice of law rules.
It is not true that the whole purpose of the law of contracts is to encourage freedom of contract or party autonomy. First, there are many cases
where the issue before the court is whether there was an agreement or not.
Some of these cases can be disposed of by saying that the parties should
normally be held to their bargains, but there are a large number of cases
where this cannot be done. Secondly, many contracts cases raise problems of
deciding what to do when the parties have completely failed to deal in advance with some particular contingency. Third, recent developments in the
law of contracts have made it clear that the courts are more and more concerned with the abuse of freedom of contract. Freedom of contract or party
autonomy is, in any case, a meaningless maxim when one realizes that freedom for one party may be the negation of effective freedom for the other.
An example of the courts ignoring the contracts issues by focussing on
the conflicts aspects is provided by the leading case of Imperial Life Assurance
Co. v. Colmenares in the Supreme Court of Canada.1 The issue in that case
was whether supervening illegality by Cuban law affected the obligation of the
company to pay the cash surrender value to the insured in Toronto. The Court
held that the proper law was Ontario law and then regarded the case as
being disposed of. One might have assumed that the next question would have
been whether the Cuban law was relevant under Ontario law. That question
would have been the only real contracts issue for the Court to consider. It
raises the general issue of frustration, or more narrowly, on the facts of this
case, whether the insurer or insured ran the risk of Cuban (or even Ontario)
legislation affecting the obligation under the contract. Insofar as the application of choice of law rules ignored these issues, there was a serious chance
that the arrangement made by the parties was subverted. (Subsequent cases,
with differently worded policies, have not lessened this chance.)
A consideration of contracts cases in a conflicts context leads to the
inescapable conclusion that choice of law rules of the traditional English or
Canadian type lead to one of two results. Either the contracts issues are
ignored and the conflicts case results in a distortion of the contracts issue or
the rules are manipulated so that the right contract result is reached but the conflicts rules are subverted. This occurs whenever the "escape devices" of characterization or renvoi are manipulated to reach whatever result the court
wants, or by use of the very open-ended test of the "proper law."
1 [1967] S.C.R. 443.
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Whatever happens under the application of the traditional rules cannot
really be conducive to "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" if
the contracts aspects of contracts cases are ignored by the conflicts rules. This
criticism can be made in every area of the law discussed by Professor Castel.
The fact is that the courts are put in an impossible position. Most judges,
most of the time, have a very clear idea of what will be a sensible result in
the cases that come before them. However, the problems they face in reaching
that result are frequently compounded by the rules they must follow. This
phenomenon is not unique to conflicts: it is found throughout the law. The
principle culprit is the academic or text-writer who fails to give the judges
the help that they need. Certainty, predictability and uniformity are jeopardized by rules that ignore the pressures that judges feel when attempting
to reach fair and sensible results. These values are more likely to be achieved
by rules that are relevant and that let the judge consider expressly what
appears to be important. At the same time, of course, this permits counsel
to argue the things that are important, thus contributing to the achievement
of whatever values we may want to stress. In this regard, I cannot accept that
the process undergone by a lawyer under the traditional rules (as outlined
by Professor Castel at p. 30) contributes in any way to the achievement of
any values the system may have.
The need to develop a more useful approach to conflicts arises in every
area discussed by Castel. Marriage and divorce, torts, etc., all have special
problems that arise from the peculiar domestic features of those areas of the
law. If the criticisms are valid in contracts, they are equally valid in any
other area of the law.
We can, I think, push this argument further, in two respects. First, the
notion of certainty in the law is a very complex idea. Certainty in contracts
is not the same as certainty in torts or in property. Sometimes we need certainty to plan our affairs, at other times we need certainty in making a settlement only after something has gone wrong. The verbal formulation of propositions that achieve certainty in these two respects can differ as much as the
Rule in Shelley's Case and the principle in Donoghue v. Stevenson. It is naive
to think that certainty comes from black-letter rules: it may, but equally,
it may not.
In a similar manner, it can be shown that the notions of predictability
and uniformity are also very complex. Uniformity presumably involves the
similar treatment of similar cases. However, to know which cases are similar is
only to know the whole of the law. Crude ideas of similarity are as dangerous
as crude ideas of certainty. Those who use the verbal formula that the law
should seek to achieve certainty, predictability and uniformity often believe
that simply making that statement justifies any form of legal reasoning or
analysis.
The second aspect to this argument is that discussions of this kind ultimately come down to a difference in legal philosophy. Everyone who thinks
about the law and how to resolve a concrete problem that might come before a judge must eventually face the question of what the law's response
should be to issues like the scope of judicial discretion and the relevance of
social values. Traditional Anglo-Canadian conflicts doctrine has adopted one
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set of answers to these issues. There are other approaches that adopt radically
different approaches. I am not suggesting that one is wholly right or that one
is completely wrong. I do believe, however, that one is better able to achieve
certain values than the other. The question of which one should be adopted
may be a matter of what one wants to achieve. What I have suggested as
defective in Professor Castel's approach to the choice of law problem is that
he adopts an approach that seeks and can only seek to achieve the values
of historical continuity and simplification of the judicial task. Historical continuity is, at best, a dubious value for the law, and simplification of the judicial task cannot be anything other than a very minor value. There are many
judicial statements making these points.
The tragedy of the choice which is made by those who advocate the
traditional rules is that it is an unconscious choice. It is necessary to spell out
explicitly the reasons for the choice, the alternatives to it, and its consequences. In a way, the tragedy is compounded when an analysis of conflicts
is proposed that assumes some very important social values will be achieved
and yet completely fails to understand either what those values really are or
how they can be achieved in concrete cases. Conflicts analysis is one of the
few places in the law where one has to speak explicitly about the ends of the
law and the means of achieving these ends; not to take advantage of this is
to leave the law without the direction it requires. It is false to suggest that
an approach which has the crude values of the traditional approach can do
anything to achieve certainty, predictability or uniformity of result, to say
nothing of "responsiveness to social commitment." If the only purposes forwarded by the law were historical continuity and simplification of the judicial
task, the law would indeed deserve the criticism it now receives and a great
deal more.
Professor Castel's work, therefore, is a good summary of how we got the
rules that we have, and what the courts have said that they were doing. It
does all of this with an impressively exhaustive survey of the cases and other
sources of the law. However, it does little to show us how the courts reached
the results that they have and where we should go from here if we are to
achieve the values he wishes to achieve. Some hope may be put in legislation,
but we have to accept that much more depends on the courts. They are, I
believe, entitled to more help than they have received up to now.
By Jonm SWAN*
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* Professor of Law, University of Toronto.

